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Although the Latin American economies1 were skeptical 
about the advantages and benefits of (free) trade during 
the belle époque (1940-1975), the devastating debt crisis 
of the 1980s forced the previously neglected export sector 
into the limelight. Countries urgently needed foreign 
currency to pay off their enormous debts, and their 
economic survival was thus determined primarily by their 
export capacity (Edwards, 1995; Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz 
and Palma, 1996; Thorp, 1998; Bulmer-Thomas, 2003).
For many reasons, a nominally pro-market economic 
reform package of 10 measures proposed and used by 
various Washington-based institutions —referred to as 
the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990)— was 
widely adopted in Latin America, although some scholars 
question to what extent the reforms implemented were 
actually pro-market (Edwards, 2010). The Consensus 
promoted the idea of free trade and stressed the need for 
a sound export sector, with opening up to international 
competition put forward as the only way to weed out 
inefficient firms. It was supposed that boosting the 
export sector would have important trickle-down 
effects for the rest of the economy (an idea present in 
Adam Smith’s work) because of which it was thought 
that export growth (maximized under free trade) and 
economic growth were closely tied. However, research 
has shown that free trade alone is not enough and can 
even be detrimental to economic growth (Taylor, 1991; 
Rodríguez and Rodrik, 1999; Van den Berg and Lewer, 
2007; Mejía, 2011). Instead, governments should take 
a more active stance by “influencing the type and 
sequencing of exports, as a country strives to produce 
more advanced products, adding higher value” (Todaro 
and Smith, 2006, p. 441).
This means that, in order for the causal chain of free 
trade, export growth, economic growth and economic 
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1 In this article, we are referring to the 11 largest economies in terms 
of gross domestic product (gdp): Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
development2 to work, an economy must export more 
value added goods, which can be achieved only through 
active government policies. Thus, countries should shift 
the emphasis of their international economic positioning 
strategy from a traditional, Ricardian (static or passive) 
approach to comparative advantages —which occur 
unintentionally— to a more dynamic strategy where 
active government or industrial policies are implemented 
to bring about the structural change required to generate 
intentional comparative advantages, though without 
disregarding free trade entirely (Agosín, 2006, p. 2; 
Mejía, 2011, p. 36). The Asian experience has shown 
that trade policies and free trade are not necessarily 
incompatible and, indeed, can be complementary 
(Fishlow and others, 1994). To put it another way, 
what matters for economic development is the quality 
of export growth.
The diversification of exports, ideally with a shift 
towards more value added goods, is a good benchmark 
against which to assess an economy’s export performance 
and “is all the more urgent in today’s economic context” 
(Leipziger, 2009, p. xi). Diversification is understood 
here as an increased variety of goods exported to a larger 
number of foreign markets, with a more even distribution 
between those markets. This last condition is not normally 
part of the definition of diversification, but we consider 
it essential since it would be erroneous, for instance, 
to claim that a country’s exports are more diversified 
when it manages to gain access to 10 new markets if 
one single foreign market continues to represent 95% 
of its total exports.
It may seem surprising to defend the idea of 
diversification, as opposed to the notion of specialization 
espoused by standard, classical trade theory; however, three 
advantages can be identified in favour of diversification 
(Mejía, 2011): (i) it operates as a hedging strategy, 
introducing more stability in export earnings; (ii) if 
other institutional conditions are in place, it can trigger 
structural change; and (iii) if that structural change 
succeeds, it can enhance sustained economic growth. 
2 Economic development is defined here as a “process of structural 
transformation where countries move from producing ‘poor-country 
goods’ to ‘rich-country goods’” (Hesse, 2008, p.1) or, in other words, 




c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 8  •  d e c e m b e r  2 0 1 2
Free trade agreements in latin america since 1990: an evaluation oF export  
diversiFication • alFonso dingemans and césar ross
29
According to Agosín (2006), in the long run, provided 
that structural change occurs, diversification can lead 
an economy to reap the benefits of a more diversified 
specialization. The causal chain we propose therefore 
is: (free trade,) export growth, export diversification, 
economic development, economic growth; free trade 
is a complementary condition, but not a sufficient one.
We must do two things in order to gain an accurate 
picture of countries’ export diversification according to 
our definition. First, we must differentiate between export 
growth (Brenton and Newfarmer, 2009, p. 112) in the 
extensive margin (growth of existing goods to existing 
markets) and that in the intensive margin (expansion of 
new goods to existing markets, existing goods to new 
markets or new products to new markets). Second, in 
follow-up to the first step, we must compute concentration 
indices (Samen, 2010). 
In spite of the arguments in favour of active 
government policies, the practice in Latin America has 
been somewhat different, with governments displaying 
a marked preference for static comparative advantages. 
Since the breakdown of the third World Trade Organization 
Ministerial Conference held in 1999 in Seattle, United 
States of America, and the standstill of the Doha Round, 
the countries in Latin America have adopted free trade 
agreements (ftas, bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements 
established under Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) as exceptions to its most-
favoured-nation provisions) as their prime vehicle of 
international economic integration. 
Their worldwide popularity prompted Bhagwati 
(1995) to speak, perhaps unfairly, of an “infatuation” 
with such agreements. As to their many positive effects, 
ftas are attributed with lowering tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, increasing market access, improving the level 
of competitiveness, fostering the growth of foreign direct 
investment (fdi), reducing levels of uncertainty and 
risk, and creating jobs thanks to higher exports (Lynch, 
2010, pp. 2-9). Furthermore, numerous academics and 
policymakers are optimistic about the impact of ftas on 
export diversification, which we shall call the fta–export 
diversification nexus.
It would seem, therefore, that ftas are in fact 
examples of active policies designed to achieve 
more diversified exports. This is partly true. When 
negotiating an fta, governments are actively pursuing 
the diversification of exports. But there are two caveats. 
First, what if ftas only confirm existing economic 
ties? Can replacing informal practices with formal 
practices really be considered an active policy? An fta 
is merely the infrastructure for trade. By analogy, when 
a government builds a bridge, it does not usually use 
policy to try to influence the type of people who use the 
bridge. Similarly, many Latin American governments, 
believing that their job is done once an fta (the bridge) 
has been signed, do not pay attention to the kind of 
goods their countries subsequently export. This approach 
is in keeping with orthodox policymaking, where the 
government provides the basic infrastructure and the 
private sector determines when and how to use it (within 
legal bounds, obviously). The idea that ftas can single-
handedly bring about export diversification is in line 
with this philosophy.
In fact, if an fta–export diversification nexus 
existed, its impact on prices would be enough to 
bring about change in the productive structure of an 
economy and the government’s role vis-à-vis economic 
development would be reduced to supplying an 
adequate infrastructure and stepping back so as not 
to interfere in its actual use. In that case, discussions 
regarding the difference between static and dynamic 
comparative advantages, and the limits between State 
and market, would be superfluous. Assessing the impact 
of ftas on export diversification is therefore crucial to 
development, both in theoretical and practical terms. 
If it were proved that a laissez-faire approach led to 
economic development, more active industrial policies 
would not be necessary.
Surprisingly, there are only a handful of investigations 
addressing this issue, with most research focusing on 
the nexus between economic growth and export growth 
(Mejía, 2011; Volpe and Milena, 2009). Hence, the time 
has come to begin to explore systematically to what 
extent ftas have been conducive to export diversification 
(the quality of export growth) in Latin America in 
order to determine how governments can or should try 
to influence export efforts, and subsequently to add to 
the broader discussion on the limits between the State 
and the market. 
This article therefore aims to contribute to a new 
research agenda that critically evaluates the economic 
integration strategies of Latin America in the light of 
export diversification rather than export growth. Because 
it is difficult to disentangle and isolate the different 
causalities at work, the first task is to describe and 
conduct a preliminary assessment of the impact of ftas 
in terms of export diversification given their popularity 
as a policy tool. We do not intend to oversimplify this 
issue by reducing it to a single factor; this is merely a 
first step that will enable us to include other contingent 
variables, such as terms of trade, at a later stage. Future 
investigations could examine the (international) politics 
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of diversification, that is, how the winners and losers of 
trade liberalization exert influence in the policymaking 
process to enhance or thwart diversification; to that 
end, future case studies could follow a model similar 
to Mejía (2011). Future research could also focus on 
alternative pathways to achieving export diversification, 
for example through foreign direct investment.3 Similarly, 
other instruments used to position Latin America in the 
global economy, such as export promotion activities, 
merit further investigation in terms of their impact on 
export diversification; however, our preliminary findings 
published elsewhere on this topic are discouraging.
In this article we will restrict ourselves to an 
exploratory, quantitative assessment of the relationship 
between ftas and export performance in terms of 
diversification using data from the United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade). 
Our findings show that ftas have had little effect on the 
productive structure of the export sector (particularly with 
regard to its ability to produce new exportable goods) and 
on its expansion into new markets. ftas do not create 
new patterns and structures, but confirm existing ones. 
This lack of structural change is further confirmed by 
fairly stable concentration indices.
First, this means that the current optimism regarding 
the fta-export diversification nexus is misplaced —and 
the argument in favour of industrial policies largely 
correct— since any diversification would be the result 
of earlier processes, that is, prior to and independent of 
the signing of ftas. This is seen most clearly in the case 
of Chile, where the diversification process took place 
in the 1970s and 1980s, not in the last 20 years; ftas 
have therefore had virtually no effect on the productive 
structure of Chilean exports. In addition, the effect of 
ftas on the creation of new markets has been limited, 
as will be shown below, since the countries that have 
signed ftas already had firm economic ties (they can 
be considered “natural markets”) and these agreements 
were merely a formal acknowledgement at the State 
level of existing informal practices. Nevertheless, we 
cannot unequivocally rule out a link between ftas 
and export diversification (the scope and aim of this 
article are too limited to be able to do that) since the
3  Foreign direct investment is an explicit issue of bilateral trade 
agreements, but it will not be addressed here because it goes beyond 
the scope of this article.
effect of each fta depends on the signatory parties’ 
“fundamentals” (the conditions each country needs 
for export diversification to take place) (Hausmann, 
Hwang and Rodrik, 2007). More case-by-case evidence 
is therefore needed.
Second, our findings support taking a more moderate 
stance on the envisaged effects of ftas. ftas are no 
guarantee of high-quality export growth and are not a 
substitute for industrial and social policies (Malvasio, 
2006). In other words, although agreements are a vital 
piece of the international trade architecture, just because 
they exist does not necessarily mean that their use will 
automatically promote diversification. Furthermore, 
even if ftas did have a diversifying effect on exports, 
the question remains as to whether the incentives 
contained in ftas would outweigh other, opposing 
incentives, such as high commodity prices (as in the 
case of China) that favour commodity exports. In that 
case a more active industrial policy could mitigate the 
influence of those other incentives. We hold that the 
market alone cannot achieve economic development 
and that industrial policies remain an important tool 
(Rodrik, 2011; Chang, 2012). Future research should 
help to identify the best policies or instruments for 
strengthening the link between the export sector and 
economic development.
This article is organized into four sections. In section 
II, we show the importance of exports in the development 
strategies of Latin American countries, and particularly 
of ftas in their international economic integration 
strategies. In section III, we assess the quality of export 
growth in our sample of countries; to that end, we set out 
our methodology and highlight the changes observed in 
the composition of countries’ trading partners and their 
exports. We then reveal the breakdown of export growth 
in the extensive and intensive margins. To complete our 
assessment of the diversification of exports, we provide 
a summary of four concentration indices (for countries 
and products). We evaluate to what extent ftas have 
been inimical to gaining access to new markets and to 
fostering change in the productive structure (exporting 
new products). Lastly, section IV contains our conclusions 
and a call for further research.
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The 1980s were difficult for Latin America. The region’s 
economies had been on a downward path since the first 
oil crisis of the early 1970s (if not before). One of the 
reasons for this was the inward-looking development 
strategy known as import-substitution industrialization 
(isi) —initially adopted by the region in response to the 
Great Depression— which had introduced an anti-export 
bias that led to serious difficulties in financing imports 
of capital goods, which was an essential part of that 
very development strategy (Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz and 
Palma, 1996). Furthermore, the excessive expansion of 
the State (in terms of both its role and its relative weight 
within the economy), though undoubtedly necessary 
for social peace, made fiscal equilibrium virtually 
impossible. The petrodollars and eurodollars that gushed 
into Latin America’s economies turned out to be a siren 
song, offering temporary relief to these economies in 
the short run, but failing, in the absence of structural 
reforms, to ward off collapse since these loans had to 
be paid back at some point. Worse still, these capital 
flows were destined for consumption rather than for 
investment and, given the highly uncompetitive export 
sector, any sudden increase in the cost of borrowing 
would make it extremely difficult to honour payments. 
Indeed, when the interest rate in the United States shot 
up in June 1982, causing a diversion of capital flows, the 
Mexican government defaulted. The ensuing financial 
panic spread to the whole region, leaving it in effect 
economically moribund. 
The orthodox interpretation of the facts blamed Latin 
America’s malaise on an excessive State presence and 
measures were proposed to unleash market forces under 
the slogan of “more market and less State” —measures 
which Williamson (1990) would dub the Washington 
Consensus. For a plethora of reasons not discussed here 
(see, for example, Edwards, 1995 and 2010; Yergin and 
Stanislaw, 1998; Thorp, 1998; Stokes, 2001), in the 
early 1990s the Latin American countries, with hardly 
any exceptions, embraced —at least nominally— the 
policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. To 
what extent the economic reforms of the 1990s can be 
considered orthodox is under debate, with some scholars 
questioning whether they can be considered orthodox at 
all (Edwards, 2010). Nevertheless, governments lowered 
their tariffs on average, though not necessarily across the 
board, and opened up their economies to international 
competition, thus joining the wave of globalization 
based on a model of static comparative advantages, since 
industrial policy had become —according to Rodrik 
(2011)— a taboo. 
The results, however, were not always positive. 
In the absence of mobility-enhancing policies (such 
as re-education plans) and social safety nets, the 
deindustrialization resulting from increased competition 
was followed by structural unemployment and 
underemployment, precarious social and economic 
conditions and a growing informal sector. Exports were 
primarily limited to agricultural and mineral commodities 
with little added value, technological innovation or 
sophistication.
The failure of the Washington Consensus to solve 
Latin America’s political, economic and social problems 
—for it would be unjust to suggest that the reforms 
introduced these problems to Latin America— eventually 
led to a backlash in the form of a “left turn” (Castañeda, 
2006). The more left-leaning governments that came into 
office improved, changed or outright replaced several of 
the reforms. Exports, however, remained the cornerstone of 
their development strategies, regardless of their antipathy, 
in some cases, towards orthodox economic thinking. Even 
Hugo Chávez in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
—a champion of anti-capitalism— and the Kirchner and 
Fernández administrations in Argentina —proponents of 
more traditional populist economic policies, as defined 
by Dornbusch and Edwards (1991)— acknowledge the 
importance of exports.
ftas would seem to be the best way to enhance 
export growth, especially in the light of failing World 
Trade Organization rounds of multilateral negotiations. 
Even Chávez dreams of a Bolivarian free-trade bloc, 
albeit exclusively for Latin American nations. The 
signing of ftas is heralded by presidents and the media 
as the quintessential vehicle for promoting free trade, 
boosting exports and gaining access to and prestige 
on the global economic and political stage. Such 
agreements are the cornerstone of Latin America’s 
II 
Latin America’s international economic 
integration through FTAs
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current international economic insertion strategy and it is 
therefore understandable that governments and scholars 
tend to have high expectations of them.
Despite the aforementioned “left turn”, governments 
are optimistic (though not complacent) regarding Latin 
America’s export growth performance and specifically 
regarding the fta–export diversification nexus. A 
quick glance at the public debate confirms this idea. 
For instance, Barbara Weisel, Assistant United States 
Trade Representative for South-East Asia and the 
Pacific, said that the fta between the United States and 
Malaysia would create new opportunities and support 
Malaysia’s goal of diversifying its exports and boosting 
value-added trade (Bernama, 2007). When asked to 
comment on the future fta between China and Peru, 
economist Michael Pettis of Peking University said 
that the current situation in China’s economy, which is 
shifting towards manufactures imports, would drive Peru 
to diversify its exports (La Primera, 2012). According 
to a report by a private consultancy firm, over the long 
term, there is little doubt that the fta between China and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) will 
help improve export diversification (bmi View, 2010). 
In a joint statement by President Obama and President 
Piñera on the occasion of President Obama’s visit to 
Chile, they underscored that in the seven years since the 
United States-Chile fta had entered into force, not only 
had the conditions of exchange of goods and services 
improved, but also new business opportunities had 
been created, leading to the diversification of products 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 2011). In a book 
published by the General Directorate for International 
Economic Affairs of Chile4 to mark 20 years of Chile’s 
experience in trade negotiations, the authors conclude 
that in the period 1990-2010 there has been considerable 
diversification in the goods the country exports and its 
trading partners (direcon, 2010, p. 11). Finally, on a 
more theoretical level, Volpe and Milena (2009, pp. 
4-5) talk of an emerging consensus in the specialized 
literature on the linkage between tariff levels and an 
economy’s ability to export new products, with most 
countries applying a Ricardian model that predicts that 
“a reduction in trade barriers leads to an increased range 
of exported goods”.
If half of these perceptions were true, the popularity 
of ftas would not be surprising, but the problem 
4 The responsibilities of the General Directorate for International 
Economic Affairs (direcon), part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Chile, include planning and executing Chile’s economic foreign 
policy and negotiating ftas. 
(potentially, at least) is that these claims are not backed 
by evidence. We should therefore assess whether ftas 
are truly conducive to export diversification or whether 
this is rather a case of “much ado about nothing”. In 
this article we will try to come to a preliminary answer 
and suggest areas for future research that may be able 
to deliver a more in-depth analysis.
First, are ftas indeed so popular? As at January 
2012, the wto5 had received some 511 notifications of 
regional trade agreements, 90% of which corresponded 
to ftas and partial trade agreements (ptas). Of these, 
some 319 agreements were in force. According to the 
Foreign Trade Information System of the Organization 
of American States,6 there are 64 ftas, 3 framework 
agreements and 33 ptas in force among its member 
States, which are summarized in table 1.7 
Chile and Mexico have signed the most ftas, while 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Colombia 
account for over 50% of all the ptas signed (see table 1). 
All of the ptas signed by the countries in Latin America 
are with partner countries in South and Central America, 
whereas some of the ftas are of an intercontinental 
nature. Traditional trade partners in Latin America, North 
America and Europe8 account for roughly 60% of all 
the agreements signed and non-traditional partners in 
Asia and Oceania account for 30%. This suggests that 
ftas are used in Latin America to confirm or deepen 
existing trade ties, rather than to establish new ones. 
Colombia, Mexico and above all Chile have signed 
the most ftas with countries from other continents. At 
the other end of the scale, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela has signed only ptas.
Latin American countries have shown an increasing 
preference for ftas over ptas. In fact, the last pta was 
signed in the region in 2004. To date, Latin American 
countries or trading blocs have signed 39 ftas against 
29 ptas. In comparison, before 1997, less than 25% 
of all trade agreements signed by Latin American 
countries were ftas. This suggests that Latin American 
countries are seeking ever broader economic integration; 
5  See [online] http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
region_e.htm.
6  See [online] http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp.
7  The ftas and ptas signed by the members of the Southern Common 
Market (mercosur) are included for each of the relevant States: thus, 
the four ftas signed by mercosur account for a total of 16 ftas in the 
table (four for each member) and the one pta signed by the trading 
bloc is counted four times (once for each member).
8  The two ftas signed by Chile and Mexico with the European Union 
are counted as two ftas and not as 27 separate agreements with each 
27 European Union member States.
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nonetheless, traces of protectionism remain, as can be 
seen, for example, in the latest measures implemented 
by President Fernández in Argentina. 
In sum, ftas appear to be an increasingly important 
instrument for achieving economic integration; however, 
the geographical distribution of fta trading partners is 
less than satisfactory, since such agreements are signed 
mainly with the region’s traditional partners, thus merely 
formalizing existing ties with natural markets rather 
than creating new ones. In addition, in line with the 
philosophy underpinning the Washington Consensus, 
ftas are seen as an end in themselves, rather than as 
an element of a more encompassing, active trade policy 
that would seek to foster the export of more value added 
products. Countries are therefore currently employing 
a strategy built around static comparative advantages. 
These points will be addressed more thoroughly in the 
next sections.
TABLE 1
latin america (selected countries): signed trade agreements in force by number of 
















Total number of 
trading partners
Argentina 4 6 10 4 8 12
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 2 1 3 5 1 6
Brazil 4 5 9 4 7 11
Chile 16 4 20 52 4 56
Colombia 5 6 11 10 25 35
Ecuador 0 4 4 0 7 7
Mexico 13 4 17 44 6 50
Paraguay 4 3 7 4 5 9
Peru 10 1 11 14 1 15
Uruguay 5 4 9 5 6 11
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0 10 10 0 29 29
Source: Foreign Trade Information System, Organization of American States (oas) [online] http://www.sice.oas.org, January 2012.
III 
latin american export growth:  
diversication or concentration?
Having discussed the importance and characteristics of 
the trade agreements (ftas and ptas) adopted as part 
of Latin America’s international economic integration 
strategies, in this section we will analyse the results of that 
strategy by looking at three areas. First, we will present 
a detailed analysis of Latin America’s export growth in 
both the extensive and intensive margins. Then we will 
assess whether Latin American countries have shown 
a tendency towards diversification or concentration in 
terms of their trading partners and the products exported. 
Third, we will investigate whether ftas have had any 
significant effect on that process of diversification or 
concentration. But before answering these questions 
we shall set out our methodology.
1. methodology
To examine the questions we have posed, we use data 
from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (comtrade),9 the most comprehensive and 
detailed database available on trade. Nevertheless, we 
9  See [online] http://comtrade.un.org/db.
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recognize that trade statistics can be susceptible to 
errors and discrepancies, and that the data available in 
comtrade are no exception.
We use the second revision of the Standard 
International Trade Classification (sitc Rev. 2), 1976, 
in order to ensure the homogeneity of data for our 
sample of countries. This classification groups goods 
under 10 headings using one-digit codes, and then 
further breaks them down until it identifies a total of 
1,924 different products using five-digit codes (United 
Nations, 1975, p. vii). The more digits we include, the 
more different products we identify; however, conducting 
our quantitative analysis at the most detailed level (five 
digits) may not actually help us to identify new exports 
that point to diversification in goods. For example, at 
the five-digit level meat with bones and meat without 
bones are considered as two different products, whereas 
for our purposes, we should group them together. Volpe 
and Milena (2009) used data at the 10-digit level of the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(an alternative to sitc) and their conclusions regarding the 
ability of tariff reductions to foster export diversification 
are accordingly overly optimistic as it is arguable whether 
they are in effect identifying significantly different 
products at that level of accuracy. We therefore seek to 
strike a balance between excessive precision and excessive 
clustering, both of which would have a negative impact 
on our results. Evenett and Venables (2002) proposed a 
simple list containing 71 products defined at the two-digit 
level, but with a minimum threshold of US$ 50,000 for 
each product line. In other words, exports of specific 
goods totalling less than US$ 50,000 were not counted 
and therefore if exports grew from, say, US$ 30,000 to 
US$ 500,000 dollars, that growth was considered to be 
in the extensive margin. For our research, our product 
list was defined at the two-digit level using sitc Rev. 2 
and we applied a threshold of US$ 50,000 per product. 
To measure change in the region’s trading partners, 
we used a threshold of US$ 500,000 per country and a 
minimum of 10 goods.10
As to the measurement points in time, we chose 
the years 1990 and 2008. The first because it preceded 
the current wave of ftas and the second because it is 
the most recent year for which data are available, taking 
into account the need for data smoothing. To control for 
10 We, in fact, repeated our analysis at the five-digit level (without a 
threshold) and, although we are unable to publish these results owing 
to space limitations, our basic findings were also supported at that 
level of detail and can therefore be considered robust. The results at 
a five-digit level can be obtained upon request from the authors.
one-off exports either in terms of the type of good or 
the destination market, we average the data from three 
points in time. Thus, the figures for 1990 and 2008 are 
actually the averages for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991 
and 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
TABLE 2
standard international trade classification 
1976 (rev. 2), one-digit codes
sitc Rev. 2 
section headings
Description
0 Food and live animals, chiefly for food
1 Beverages and tobacco
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
5 Chemicals and related products not elsewhere 
specified
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
materials
7 Machinery and transport equipment
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
9 Commodities and transactions not elsewhere 
classified
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(comtrade).
By choosing 2008 for our analysis, we must exclude 
all the agreements that came into force after that year. 
The vast majority of ftas and ptas were signed before 
2006, which leaves us with enough time for their possible 
effects to be captured by our data.
Interpreting the data from these years poses certain 
difficulties as the fall of the Iron Curtain led to the 
creation of several new countries in the early 1990s. The 
Soviet Union ceased to exist, while new independent 
States, such as Croatia, were established. In addition, in 
1990 there was a decision to separate data on Belgium 
and Luxembourg in comtrade (they had previously 
been treated as a single entity). As each country has a 
separate country code, these events artificially led to the 
gain or loss of trading partners for our selection of Latin 
American countries, irrespective of their intentions or 
efforts. Nevertheless, trying to retroactively calculate the 
gdp of the present-day countries that made up Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union would be a difficult 
and arbitrary exercise and it would be impossible to 
trace which products were exported where. Owing to 
the difficulties caused by the lack of accurate data, we 
decided to maintain the original country coding. In what 
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follows, then, we have to be careful when interpreting 
the data on changes in trading partners, since both losses 
and acquisitions are overstated. In our comparative 
analysis, however, this overvaluation should not affect 
the essence of our conclusions.
All of the figures we present are in United States 
dollars at constant 2008 prices in order to control for 
inflation, which has been considerable in the last 20 years 
in Latin America, although admittedly less problematic 
than in prior decades. The 1990 figures are therefore 
deflated by the official United States price level reported 
by the World Bank in its World Development Indicators11.
All the data were processed using the default 
routines of the standard statistical package ibm spss 
Statistics, version 19.0.
2. the quality of latin american export growth
In order to quantify export growth we first compare 
total exports for our sample of Latin American countries 
in 1990 with 2008 (see table 3). We have three main 
observations with regard to real export growth. First, 
all countries, except for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Uruguay, at least doubled their real export 
value during the period under consideration. With the 
exception of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
11  See [online] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay, exports grew at an 
average annual rate of 7% or more in all countries, with 
Mexico and Peru achieving double-digit growth. In other 
words, at first glance the results of the Latin American 
economies in terms of export growth are encouraging 
and, indeed, more than satisfactory when compared with 
their average annual real gdp growth. 
However, the difference between the pace of average 
export growth and average real gdp growth suggests that 
the impact of the former on the latter is not proportional. 
A second conclusion is that there is no significant linear 
correlation between the number of signed treaties and 
export growth. At this point, we need to perform a more 
detailed analysis.
TABLE 3
latin america (selected countries): real export growth, 1990 and 2008 
(Thousands of United States dollars at constant 2008 prices and percentages)
 



















real gdp growth 
(Percentages)
Argentina 18 581 526 60 490 183 41 908 657 226 7.2 4.0
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 1 448 436 5 669 593 4 221 157 291 8.4 3.7
Brazil 53 407 971 170 528 685 117 120 714 219 7.1 2.8
Chile 14 075 528 62 408 984 48 333 456 343 9.2 5.2
Colombia 10 840 779 33 490 067 22 649 288 209 6.9 3.5
Ecuador 4 342 018 15 493 913 11 151 895 257 7.8 3.2
Mexico 41 858 114 264 266 121 222 408 006 531 11.4 2.8
Paraguay 1 483 131 3 482 506 1 999 375 135 5.1 2.5
Peru 5 074 031 28 703 686 23 629 654 466 10.1 4.5
Uruguay 2 674 770 5 281 651 2 606 881 97 4.1 2.9
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 25 368 189 46 686 981 21 318 792 84 3.7 2.9
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade) and World Bank 
Development Indicators (average annual gdp growth).
3. changes in export markets
As mentioned above, the quality of growth depends on 
the ability to export a greater variety of products to more 
markets (and ideally in a more evenly distributed way). So, 
in order to break down our figures we need to establish 
first to what extent the mix of products and countries 
has changed (if at all). We begin by addressing the latter.
A simple count shows that all the countries in the 
study, except the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
increased the number of their trading partners and are 
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therefore geographically more diversified than in 1990 
(see table 4). We recall that for our purposes a country 
must receive exports totalling more than the threshold 
of US$ 500,000 to be considered a destination market. 
The case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is 
pathological: as a result of its overdependence on oil 
the country lost 37 markets. Other striking cases include 
Brazil (the most diversified country), the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia (the least diversified, although it is 
improving), Mexico (the least successful at entering 
into new markets) and Argentina (the most successful). 
In short, Latin American goods reached comparatively 
more markets in 2008 than in 1990, and therefore we 
could initially be inclined to conclude that exports are 
geographically more diversified, thus giving hope to the 
supporters of the fta-export diversification nexus. But 
before drawing such a conclusion, we shall consider 
whether the top five destinations for our sample (in 
terms of export value) have changed much. To this end, 
we computed the share of each trading partner in the 
total exports of each of our Latin American countries 
(see table 5).
TABLE 4














Argentina 112 160 43 59 53 11 10
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 32 52 63 25 78 5 16
Brazil 156 188 21 51 33 19 12
Chile 95 134 41 54 57 15 16
Colombia 82 125 52 52 63 9 11
Ecuador 59 89 51 39 66 9 15
Mexico 109 147 35 55 50 17 16
Paraguay 50 77 54 37 74 10 20
Peru 84 115 37 39 46 8 10
Uruguay 74 112 51 49 66 11 15
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 93 67 -28 11 12 37 40
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
TABLE 5
latin america (selected countries): top five export destinations, 1990 and 2008
(Percentages of total exports)
1990 2008
Argentina United States 12 Brazil 19
  Brazil 12 China 8
  Netherlands 11 United States 7
  Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(ussr)
5 Chile 7
  Italy 4 Netherlands 4
Bolivia (Plur. State of) Argentina 28 Brazil 38
  United States 20 Republic of Korea 9
  United Kingdom 12 Argentina 8
  Belgium-Luxembourg 8 United States 8
  Brazil 6 Japan 5
Brazil United States 22 United States 13
  Japan 8 China 9
  Netherlands 7 Argentina 9
  Italy 4 Netherlands 5
  Former Federal Republic of Germany 3 Germany 4
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1990 2008
Chile United States 17 China 17
  Japan 16 United States 12
  Former Federal Republic of Germany 7 Japan 10
  United Kingdom 6 Republic of Korea 6
  Brazil 6 Netherlands 5
Colombia United States 42 United States 38
  Former Federal Republic of Germany 5 Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 15
  Netherlands 5 Ecuador 4
  Panama 4 Netherlands 3
  Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 4 Switzerland 3
Ecuador United States 54 United States 41
  Peru 6 Peru 9
  Republic of Korea 4 Panama 7
  Netherlands Antilles 4 Chile 7
  Panama 4 Colombia 5
Mexico United States 70 United States 81
  Japan 5 Canada 3
  Spain 5 Germany 2
  France 2 Spain 1
  Canada 1 Colombia 1
Paraguay Brazil 31 Brazil 17
  Netherlands 16 Argentina 15
  Switzerland 6 Uruguay 15
  Argentina 6 Chile 9
  United States 4 Russian Federation 5
Peru United States 24 United States 19
  Japan 11 China 13
  Italy 7 Switzerland 11
  Former Federal Republic of Germany 5 Canada 7
  United Kingdom 4 Japan 6
Uruguay Brazil 27 Brazil 18
  United States 10 Free zones 10
  Argentina 7 Argentina 8
  Former Federal Republic of Germany 5 United States 6
  China 5 Russian Federation 4
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) United States 53 Areas, nes 25
  Areas, nes 8 Latin American Integration Association (laia), nes 20
  Netherlands Antilles 4 United States 19
  Netherlands 3 North and Central America, nes 10
  Canada 3 Netherlands Antilles 9
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
Abbreviation: nes, not elsewhere specified.
Table 5 (concluded)
By 2008, the countries of Asia, especially China, 
had become a crucial trading partner for Latin America, 
overtaking many European countries. The rise of Brazil 
within the region is worthy of note. The fastest growing 
destination countries for Latin American exports were 
China, Republic of Korea, Brazil and, perhaps surprisingly, 
the United States. The presence of the United States in 
this group shows that traditional markets are still some 
of Latin America’s most dynamic trading partners and it 
would therefore be a mistake to concentrate excessively 
on new, emerging markets; achieving a balanced mix 
of destination markets, in order to spread the risk 
geographically, is more desirable.
This brings us to our second conclusion in this 
connection: despite the appearance of new markets, the 
structure of the market shares of each country —and 
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therefore their risk-spreading capacity— has not changed 
dramatically. In our view, diversification is not just 
a matter of having more trading partners: the export 
shares of each partner matter as well. The concentration 
of exports does not seem to have changed much, with 
the top five destinations continuing to represent similar 
shares in 2008 as they did in 1990 (this will be verified 
below). To make matters worse for the supporters of 
the fta-export diversification nexus, none of the top-
performing partners are new according to our definition. 
The new markets in the top-five lists for Uruguay and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela include one former 
Soviet republic and artificial groupings owing to a lack 
of more precise data. Current ftas are therefore either 
limited to existing trading partners or incapable of opening 
up considerable access to new markets.
4. changes in exported products
We now turn to an evaluation of the number of products 
exported, recalling that for a product to be identified as 
“new”, we apply a threshold of US$ 50,000 per product, 
with products defined at the two-digit level using sitc 
Rev. 2. Accordingly, we counted the existing exports 
for each country in our sample in 1990 and in 2008.
Table 6 shows that, with the exception of Mexico 
and, curiously enough, Chile, all countries began to export 
new products during the period under consideration. 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela stand out in terms of the number 
of products they stopped exporting between 1990 and 
2008 (see the last column of table 6, “products no 
longer exported”). The net result, however, is that the 
exports of all countries, except the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, are at least equally as diversified in 2008 
as in 1990. The situation of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela can be explained by its increasing dependence 
on oil, which currently makes up 95% of its exports.
TABLE 6
latin america (selected countries): number of exports,  
defined at the two-digit level (SITC rev. 2) 
 
Number of products 
exported, 1990
Number of products 
exported, 2008













Argentina 66 67 2 1 2 0 0
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 40 49 23 15 38 6 15
Brazil 66 67 2 1 2 0 0
Chile 67 67 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 63 67 6 4 6 0 0
Ecuador 51 61 20 10 20 0 0
Mexico 68 68 0 0 0 0 0
Paraguay 50 58 16 9 18 1 2
Peru 62 66 7 4 6 0 0
Uruguay 61 64 5 3 5 0 0
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 61 59 -3 2 3 4 7
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
Abbreviation: sitc, Standard International Trade Classification.
When we disaggregate these figures (not shown 
here for lack of space), we can identify some interesting 
features. For example, the Plurinational State of Bolivia has 
stopped exporting rubber, but continues to depend heavily 
on primary exports, with oil accounting for a growing 
proportion of its exports. An increasing dependence on 
commodities is in fact seen across the countries of Latin 
America. Peru has experienced a major rise in its share 
of exports under heading number 9 (from 1% to 19%); 
Ecuador saw a fall in its exports under heading 0 and a 
substantial increase under heading 3; while the share of 
Paraguay’s exports went up under heading 0 and down 
under heading 2. These seemingly structural changes simply 
reflect the substitution of one commodity by another. In the 
case of Ecuador, for example, the petroleum sector simply 
outperformed other strong sectors, such as vegetables and 
fish exports. Paraguay’s star commodities were cereals 
and oil-seeds, and the decrease in the relative share of the 
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textile sector was caused by negative growth. For Peru 
the change in distribution is attributable in large part to 
a spectacular rise in gold exports. However promising 
this performance might be, it is a traditional sector of 
the Peruvian economy, dating back to pre-colonial times. 
In other words, despite the impression that a structural 
change has taken place, the region’s export mix remains 
limited to commodities. 
A possible exception is Mexico whose impressive 
growth in machinery and transport equipment (from 27% 
to 53%) and in manufactures (from 4% to 10%) suggest 
that it exported more value added goods. However, this 
increase is most likely attributable to the maquila sector 
(see, for example, Kopinak, 1996). The heavy United 
States presence in the Mexican economy means that 
there are probably few spillover effects. The supporters 
of the fta-export diversification nexus can nevertheless 
claim that this positive effect, however limited, is caused 
primarily by Mexico signing the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (nafta). While this may be true, our 
data show that nafta has failed to lead to the export of 
new goods, and its effects on export diversification and 
structural change are therefore modest at best. 
Finally, even the performance of Latin America’s 
export champion, Chile, falls short. According to our data, 
its top exports are non-ferrous metals (mainly copper), 
metalliferous ores (copper again) and vegetables and fruit. 
Thus even Chile still depends heavily on commodities 
for its exports.
Table 7 paints a clear picture of this trend by 
presenting the top three exports in terms of value for 
each country in our sample.
TABLE 7
latin america (selected countries): top three exports defined  
at the two-digit level (SITC rev. 2) in terms of value 












Argentina Feeding stuff for animals 2 086 154 11 Feeding stuff for animals 7 539 836 12
  Cereals 2 007 346 11 Cereals 5 713 809 9
  Fixed vegetable oils and fats 1 757 710 9 Road vehicles 5 710 469 9
Bolivia (Plur. 
State of)
Metalliferous ores 429 963 30 Gas, natural and 
manufactured 
2 371 695 42
Gas, natural and 
manufactured
370 254 26 Metalliferous ores 1 354 171 24
Non-ferrous metals 204 826 14 Feeding stuff for animals 297 922 5
Brazil Iron and Steel 6 626 288 12 Metalliferous ores 16 696 622 10
  Metalliferous ores 4 445 904 8 Petroleum 14 829 089 9
  Coffee 3 227 066 6 Meat 12 310 916 7
Chile Non-ferrous metals 5 349 014 38 Non-ferrous metals 22 282 866 36
  Metalliferous ores 1 898 034 13 Metalliferous ores 15 034 259 24
  Vegetables and fruit 1 430 838 10 Vegetables and fruit 4 247 813 7
Colombia Petroleum 2 638 905 24 Petroleum 9 781 528 29
  Coffee 2 478 690 23 Coal, cokes and briquettes 4 651 420 14
  Coal, cokes and briquettes 894 728 8 Coffee 2 005 732 6
Ecuador Petroleum 2 033 015 47 Petroleum 8 987 801 58
  Vegetables and fruit 872 661 20 Vegetables and fruit 1 953 539 13
  Fish, crustacean and 
mollusks
768 844 18 Fish, crustacean and 
mollusks
1 561 592 10
Mexico Petroleum 13 696 251 33 Petroleum 40 598 789 15
  Road vehicles 5 263 925 13 Road vehicles 39 151 725 15
  Power generating machinery 
and equipment
2 517 816 6 Telecommunications and 
sound equipment 
38 460 315 15
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Based on these data, we conclude, first, that the 
region has seen little change in its export mix. Second, 
judging from the shares of the top three exports for each 
country, the distribution of exports in 2008 is very similar 
to in 1990. The exports of Latin American economies 
continue to be heavily concentrated in and dependent 
on primary commodities.
In sum, our data show that there has been little 
change in the production mix of these export sectors 
and the desired increase in value added products has 
certainly not been seen. Even the two exceptions, Mexico 
and Argentina, have not been able to create new higher 
value added goods. Consequently, we do not expect to 
see any significant growth in the extensive margin, which 
we will address in the next subsection.
5.  growth in the extensive and intensive margins
Let us now turn our attention to the quality of Latin 
American export growth during the period 1990-2008. 
The level of diversification can be assessed by quantifying 
growth in the extensive and intensive margins and 
computing the relevant concentration indices. We use the 
definition of extensive and intensive margins presented 
in Brenton and Newfarmer (2009, p. 112), according to 
which export growth can take place in relation to either 
a country’s markets or products, which can be either 
new or existing, giving us four possible combinations. 
The expansion of exports of an existing product 
to an existing market contributes to growth in the 
intensive margin. Increased exports of a new product 
to a new market can be classified as export growth in 
the extensive margin, which we will refer to as type II. 
The two remaining combinations contain both a new 
and an existing element. Type Ia export growth in the 
extensive margin involves the export of a new product to 
an existing market. Lastly, we will refer to an increase in 
exports of an existing commodity to a new market as type 
Ib export growth in the extensive margin (see table 8). 
The data in table 8 confirm our suspicions, for 
they indicate that, in general, export growth in Latin 
America involves the expansion of existing products 
to existing markets (intensive margin). Even for Latin 
America’s most active fta signatory, Chile, the intensive 
margin accounts for 95.9% of its total export growth. 
The figure for Mexico is even more extreme: 98.9% of 
its total export growth is in the intensive margin. The 
virtual absence of type II growth in the extensive margin 
points to the generalized failure of the current Latin 
American international economic positioning strategy 
to create new opportunities. In fact, when we analyse 
the quality of growth broken down according to the 10 
sitc Rev. 2 one-digit section headings, we can confirm 
that the Latin American economies have hardly achieved 
any extensive growth in the high-technology or higher 












Paraguay Textile fibers 521 564 35 Oil seeds 1 150 657 33
  Oil seeds 452 309 30 Meat 521 811 15
  Meat 156 231 11 Feeding stuff for animals 411 909 12
Peru Non-ferrous metals 1 275 859 25 Metalliferous ores 8 143 503 28
  Metalliferous ores 963 191 19 Gold 5 496 655 19
  Feeding stuff for animals 666 059 13 Non-ferrous metals 4 215 068 15
Uruguay Textile fibres 488 295 18 Meat 1 129 686 21
  Meat 411 391 15 Cereals 723 320 14
  Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories





Petroleum 19 951 725 79 Petroleum 44 028 286 94
Non-ferrous metals 1 423 300 6 Iron and Steel 870 092 2
Iron and Steel 855 551 3 Non-ferrous metals 452 126 1
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
Abbreviation: sitc, Standard International Trade Classification.
Table 7 (concluded)
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Nevertheless, there is a small spark of hope for the 
supporters of the fta-export diversification nexus. The 
Latin American economies have fared relatively better in 
achieving extensive growth in terms of new markets. To 
what extent ftas (and trade agreements in general) are 
responsible for creating new markets will be analysed 
below. We will also look at how the changes in the shares 
of the export markets and goods have contributed to 
the relative diversification or concentration of exports.
6. diversification or concentration of exports?
The diversification of exports can be measured in many 
ways; we have chosen to use four common concentration 
indices identified by Samen (2010), namely the Herfindahl 
index, the Hirschman index, the Ogive index and the 
entropy index. But, in contrast to the standard practice 
of computing these indices only for goods, we will also 
calculate them for countries. This way we will have two 
values for each concentration index for each country: 
one for growth in relation to products and one in relation 
to trading partners.













Where xi is defined as the total exports of product 
i or as the total exports to country i, and Xj is defined 
as the total exports of country j. N is the total number 
of goods (or countries). The definition of these symbols 
will be maintained throughout this article.













Basically, the Hirschman index is equal to the root 
of the Herfindahl index. In both cases, they compare the 
actual concentration with an evenly distributed export 
mix of goods (or export markets), and a higher index 
indicates a greater concentration of exports. In the case of 
absolute concentration, the index would be equal to one 
and in the most diversified case it would be close to zero.












This index measures the deviation from an equal 
distribution of export shares (in terms of goods or 
TABLE 8
latin america (selected countries): export growth  
in the intensive and extensive margins 

















Argentina 41 908 657 37 921 985 90.5 767 685 1.8 3 218 058 7.7 930 0.0
Bolivia (Plur. 
State of)
4 221 157 3 665 666 86.8 167 837 4.0 385 234 9.1 2 420 0.1
Brazil 117 120 714 103 406 173 88.3 381 132 0.3 13 333 410 11.4 - 0.0
Chile 48 333 456 46 374 130 95.9 - 0.0 1 959 326 4.1 - 0.0
Colombia 22 649 288 20 325 116 89.7 1 347 289 5.9 976 883 4.3 - 0.0
Ecuador 11 151 895 9 762 534 87.5 120 609 1.1 1 228 834 11.0 39 918 0.4
Mexico 222 408 006 219 870 841 98.9 - 0.0 2 537 166 1.1 - 0.0
Paraguay 1 999 375 1 502 079 75.1 10 290 0.5 486 611 24.3 395 0.0
Peru 23 629 593 22 920 015 97.0 7 876 3.0 701 599 0.0 350 0.0
Uruguay 2 606 881 1 461 283 56.1 26 565 1.0 1 119 002 42.9 31 0.0
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of)
21 318 792 6 133 959 28.8 12 198 0.1 15 172 632 71.2 3 0.0
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
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countries). 1/N is considered to be the ideal share of a 
product (or trading partner) in total exports. When the 
value approaches zero, it means that the export sector 
is highly diversified. An index close to one means that 
it is highly concentrated.


















In contrast to the other measures, the maximum 
is attained when all products (or countries) are evenly 
distributed. Thus, lower values indicate a higher 
concentration of exports. 
The results of these four indices are presented in 
table 9. As the results of the four indices are consistent, 
we will focus our analysis on the Herfindahl index. 
We can draw some interesting conclusions from the 
indices. First, there tends to be a correlation between the 
indices for products and trading partners, with the only 
exceptions being Mexico and the Bolivarian Republic 
TABLE 9 
latin america (selected countries): commonly used concentration indices calculated  
for trading partners and products defined at the two-digit level (SITC rev. 2).
Index
Products Trading partners
1990 2008 1990 2008
Argentina HI1 0.060 0.058 0.055 0.064
HI2 0.244 0.242 0.235 0.254
OGV 2.972 2.932 5.274 7.478
ENT 4.632 4.736 5.001 5.045
Bolivia (Plur. State of) HI1 0.180 0.242 0.151 0.176
HI2 0.425 0.492 0.388 0.419
OGV 6.765 11.140 9.926 8.097
ENT 3.212 2.925 3.337 3.471
Brazil HI1 0.046 0.044 0.073 0.047
HI2 0.215 0.211 0.270 0.217
OGV 2.076 1.991 8.768 7.076
ENT 4.970 5.012 5.046 5.372
Chile HI1 0.184 0.197 0.079 0.072
HI2 0.429 0.443 0.280 0.268
OGV 11.333 12.178 6.290 6.464
ENT 3.477 3.403 4.458 4.559
Colombia HI1 0.133 0.119 0.192 0.175
HI2 0.364 0.345 0.438 0.418
OGV 7.434 6.970 12.828 14.741
ENT 3.758 4.200 3.873 3.913
Ecuador HI1 0.300 0.365 0.303 0.193
HI2 0.548 0.604 0.550 0.440
OGV 14.628 21.384 14.201 11.981
ENT 2.243 2.498 3.111 3.581
Mexico HI1 0.136 0.086 0.496 0.659
HI2 0.369 0.294 0.704 0.812
OGV 8.244 4.870 38.355 66.268
ENT 4.130 4.297 2.317 1.654
Paraguay HI1 0.233 0.172 0.141 0.093
HI2 0.482 0.414 0.375 0.305
OGV 10.856 9.015 8.112 5.780
ENT 2.817 3.276 3.762 4.288
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1990 2008 1990 2008
Peru HI1 0.136 0.154 0.084 0.082
HI2 0.369 0.392 0.290 0.287
OGV 7.417 9.179 6.317 6.470
ENT 3.538 3.422 4.513 4.341
Uruguay HI1 0.093 0.086 0.104 0.064
HI2 0.304 0.294 0.323 0.254
OGV 4.709 4.538 7.306 5.320
ENT 4.144 4.393 4.308 4.900
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) HI1 0.624 0.890 0.292 0.164
HI2 0.790 0.943 0.541 0.405
OGV 37.169 51.654 18.323 8.677
ENT 1.631 0.523 3.204 3.102
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
Abbreviations: sitc, Standard International Trade Classification; HI1, Herfindahl index; HI2, Hirschman index; OGV, Ogive index; ENT, 
entropy index.
of Venezuela, for reasons already mentioned. Second, 
only four countries succeeded in diversifying both their 
markets and their exports (Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay 
and Uruguay), although in general these changes were 
only minimal. Third, diversification, however small, 
was achieved to a greater extent in relation to target 
markets than goods. 
Table 9 (concluded)
Before drawing hasty conclusions, however, we have 
to acknowledge the sensitivity (with the exception of the 
Ogive index) of these indices to the number of products 
or trading partners. To wit, the index favours countries 
with a small N (ceteris paribus). Therefore it is common to 
compare these indices for a fixed N. The results for the top 
10 products and export markets are presented in table 10. 
TABLE 10
latin america (selected countries):Herfindahl index calculated for the  
top 10 products (two-digit level, SITC rev. 2) and trading partners
 
Products Trading partners
1990 2008 1990 2008
Argentina 0.113 0.125 0.138 0.171
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 0.230 0.290 0.181 0.233
Brazil 0.124 0.117 0.194 0.147
Chile 0.245 0.278 0.144 0.142
Colombia 0.191 0.230 0.342 0.322
Ecuador 0.318 0.432 0.431 0.278
Mexico 0.261 0.152 0.643 0.783
Paraguay 0.266 0.211 0.219 0.159
Peru 0.172 0.189 0.178 0.147
Uruguay 0.146 0.163 0.193 0.149
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.710 0.910 0.427 0.187
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
Abbreviation: sitc, Standard International Trade Classification.
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When controlling for the number of exported 
goods and trading partners, we find that the only two 
countries that have diversified in both dimensions are 
Brazil and Paraguay. The export mix of Colombia and 
Uruguay is relatively small in comparison with the rest 
of Latin America as their economies are increasingly 
concentrated in commodities. The fact that they score 
better on the Herfindhal index than the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, which has an even smaller amount 
of exported goods, is not a contradiction: the top three 
exports of the Plurinational State of Bolivia represent 
a higher share than those of Colombia and Uruguay.
Another difference in the values given by the two 
indices is that, according to the Herfindhal index, Chile 
is the most diversified in terms of trading partners, while 
the Ogive index places Chile third, behind Paraguay and 
Uruguay. The difference is that the top-10 Herfindahl 
index excludes commodities, whereas the Ogive index 
does not. What is consistent between the two indices, 
however, is that Chile has fared better at diversifying its 
trading partners than the products it exports.
In sum, these concentration indices did not produce 
any major surprises. The limited structural changes they 
revealed showed a greater diversification in terms of 
trading partners than products. This supports our claim 
that the productive structure of the export sector in Latin 
American countries has not changed significantly. The 
absence of an effect does not necessarily mean that ftas 
(and trade agreements in general) are ineffective and 
perhaps the findings would have been bleaker if no ftas 
had been signed. However, we believe that this is highly 
unlikely and will tackle this question in the next subsection. 
7.  FTAs and diversication
The coverage of ftas is significant: as shown in table 
11, the exports covered by a pta or fta have increased 
since 1990 for all countries except Uruguay.
The expanding coverage of ftas is hardly surprising, 
considering that most of these agreements were signed 
after 1990. Nevertheless, their impact has been astonishing 
in the cases of Mexico and Chile, with 94% and 80%, 
respectively, of their trade with other countries covered 
by ftas. At the other extreme, less than 10% of the 
total exports of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Colombia and Ecuador are covered by ftas.
Table 12 shows whether these ftas created new 
markets or merely confirmed existing ties.
TABLE 11
latin america (selected countries): exports covered  
and not covered by trade agreements
(Thousands of United States dollars at constant 2008 prices and percentages)
 
Total exports, 1990 Total exports, 2008













Argentina 18 582 100 0 0 36 717 272 61 23 772 911 39
Bolivia  
(Plur. State of)
1 448 436 100 0 0 3 032 614 53 2 636 979 47
Brazil 53 407 971 100 0 0 137 078 944 80 33 449 741 20
Chile 14 075 528 100 0 0 11 772 471 19 50 636 513 81
Colombia 10 294 937 95 545 841 5 30 498 885 91 2 991 182 9
Ecuador 4 342 018 100 0 0 14 334 362 93 1 159 551 7
Mexico 41 229 536 98 628 579 2 16 331 152 6 247 934 969 94
Paraguay 1 483 131 100 0 0 2 294 703 66 1 187 803 34
Peru 4 930 197 98 91 303 2 18 980 869 66 9 722 816 34
Uruguay 1 944 685 73 730 086 27 4 231 930 80 1 049 721 20
Venezuela  
(Bol. Rep. of)
24 680 937 97 687 252 3 44 806 718 96 1 880 264 4
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
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TABLE 12
latin america (selected countries): exports to trading partners  
before and after signing free trade agreements, 1990 and 2008 
(Thousands of United States dollars at constant 2008 prices and percentages of total exports)
 
Exports in 1990 to future fta partners Exports in 2008 to fta partners Annual average 
growthThousands of dollars Percentage of total Thousands of dollars Percentage of total
Argentina 4 870 976 26.20 23 772 911 39.30 9.8
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 495 557 34.20 2 636 979 46.50 10.3
Brazil 5 586 579 10.50 33 449 741 19.60 11.1
Chile 9 758 851 69.30 50 636 513 81.10 10.2
Colombia 607 489 5.60 2 991 182 8.90 9.8
Ecuador 178 728 4.10 1 159 551 7.50 11.6
Mexico 37 302 311 89.10 247 934 969 93.80 11.8
Paraguay 161 372 10.90 1 187 803 34.10 12.5
Peru 1 513 771 30.10 9 722 816 33.90 11.6
Uruguay 344 525 12.90 1 049 721 19.90 6.8
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 1 943 532 7.70 1 880 264 4.00 -0.2
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
The data show that trade with future fta partners 
was already relatively substantial in 1990 and their share 
in total exports rose significantly between 1990 and 2008 
for all countries except for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela. Average annual growth in exports to fta 
partners was higher than the growth seen in exports to all 
countries (see table 3). Given the existing significance of 
these export destinations for the economies in question, it 
is difficult to conclude that the trade agreements opened 
up new markets.
In terms of access to new markets, our data indicate 
that only six countries began exporting to new countries 
(according to our threshold) under a trade agreement. 
Disregarding the Eastern European countries established 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and other 
artificial changes (such as the separation of data on 
Belgium and Luxembourg in comtrade), Chile gained 
access to the markets of Bulgaria, Iceland, and Malta; 
Colombia to Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Guyana and 
Saint Kitts and Nevis; Ecuador to Paraguay and Uruguay 
(which fell short of the threshold in 1990); Mexico to 
Bulgaria, Iceland and Romania; Paraguay to Ecuador 
(which fell short of the threshold in 1990); and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to Belize. This list 
is hardly impressive: the access gained represents less 
than 1% of the total exports of these countries in 2008 
(hence, these results are economically insignificant). 
Bulgaria and Romania were new actors in the market 
economy and it is therefore not clear that an fta with the 
European Union was necessary to gain access to their 
markets. Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay are natural 
trading partners and trade between them would most 
probably have expanded even without trade agreements.
All of this suggests that, on the whole, ftas (and 
trade agreements in general) have been rather ineffective 
with regard to fostering access to markets, particularly 
new markets. Of course, an optimistic interpretation 
would be that, given this difference in growth rates, 
there remain dynamic markets available with which the 
Latin American countries could sign an fta in order to 
further boost their performance. While this is possible, 
in the case of Chile, for example, there are few countries 
left with which it does not already have an agreement. 
Furthermore, the most growth was seen in exports to the 
United States and China —both countries with which Chile 
already had strong economic ties. From the standpoint of 
geographical diversification, signing an fta with either 
of those two countries would not make much sense.
Another hypothesis is that if ftas were signed with 
new trading partners, then type Ib export growth in the 
intensive margin would occur naturally. Hence, the true 
potential of ftas is not really being measured. This is true, 
in theory, but the list of existing trade partners leaves little 
room for further expansion. It is questionable whether the 
reward would be worth the diplomatic effort involved in 
negotiating agreements with the mainly small countries 
that remain. In truth, given the existing, endogenously 
created economic ties, the idea behind signing an fta 
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is not to gain access to new markets, but to diversify an 
economy’s export mix. Of course countries want to see 
growth in the intensive margin, but this is a short-term 
gain. The long-term gain is obtained through diversification 
and ftas are ineffective to that end.
The data in table 13 show that trade agreements 
have not been instrumental in fostering the export of new 
products, except in the cases of Brazil and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. And indeed, no trade agreement 
has achieved the “purest” form of diversification (new 
countries and new products).
This ends our preliminary assessment of the 
relationship between trade agreements, particularly 
ftas, and export diversification in terms of both trading 
partners and products. An analysis of the data has 
confirmed our main hypothesis: ftas are a useful and 
perhaps necessary element of a country’s international 
economic positioning strategy, but if diversification is 
the objective (as it should be), these agreements must be 
complemented with other industrial policies. As Osvaldo 
Rosales, former chief negotiator of Chile, said, an fta 
is no guarantee of economic success (Malvasio, 2006). 
TABLE 13
latin america (selected countries): export growth  
by type of growth and existence of a trade agreement 
(Thousands of United States dollars at constant 2008 prices and percentages)
 
Extensive margin Ia Extensive margin II













Argentina 767 560 100 125 0 930 100 ... 0
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 160 608 96 7 229 4 2 420 100 ... 0
Brazil ... ... 381 132 100 ... ... ... ...
Chile ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Colombia 1 333 290 99 13 999 1 ... ... ... ...
Ecuador 100 883 84 19 726 16 39 285 98 633 2
Mexico ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Paraguay 6 803 66 3 488 34 370 94 25 6
Peru 4 954 63 2 922 37 350 100 ... 0
Uruguay 954 4 25 611 96 31 100 ... 0
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 55 0 12 143 100 3 100 ... 0
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (comtrade).
IV
Conclusions
Where does this leave us? Let us sum up the facts. Latin 
America’s international economic integration strategies 
have focused on the signing of ftas and ptas. At first 
glance, export growth performance has been encouraging, 
but when we disaggregate the data on growth, several 
question marks arise. First, although the increase in 
the number of trading partners has been considerable, 
and there has undoubtedly been a shift towards Asian 
countries, the distribution of the shares of the top five 
export markets has remained almost unchanged. Countries 
have therefore achieved little overall in terms of spreading 
their risk. Second, diversification into new exports has 
been disappointing. In the few cases where countries 
began to export new products, these were generally 
commodities that substituted other commodities exports. 
The export mix of the top three products for each country 
remained largely unchanged and, therefore, countries 
did not succeed in bringing about a structural change in 
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their economies. Export growth is mainly attributable 
to growth in the intensive margin. A closer look at the 
concentration indices shows modest improvements in 
terms of the number of trading partners, but not in relation 
to the number of products. Finally, these findings are 
corroborated by cross-referencing the data on export 
growth and the existence of ftas: these agreements have 
been largely ineffective in fostering export diversification.
ftas, unsupported by other more comprehensive 
policies, are indicative of laissez-faire policy approach. 
These agreements cannot be considered an element of 
active policy as they simply confirm existing informal 
practices and do not influence or guide new processes. 
There has been a disregard for country “fundamentals” 
(Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007) since it is believed 
that ftas foster export diversification regardless.
Is Latin America’s continuing dependence on 
primary exports solely explained by ftas? Certainly 
not. Often, contingent economic incentives can be 
counterproductive to export diversification, as is seen 
most clearly by China’s overpowering demand for natural 
resources and the resulting appreciation of national 
currencies in Latin America. ftas would be powerless 
in the face of such economic forces, even if they did 
foster export diversification. While this article does not 
attempt to unravel the causes of export diversification, a 
broad, active industrial policy would likely have a better 
chance of mitigating these perverse incentives than the 
narrower scope of ftas.
Does this mean that ftas are superfluous? On the 
contrary, we acknowledge that ftas have numerous 
benefits, just not this one in particular, at least not 
without the backing of a comprehensive export strategy. 
An fta alone will not change the productive structure 
of an economy. Unlike the former economic advisor 
to President George H.W. Bush Michael Boskin, who 
famously said that it did not matter whether an economy 
made computer chips or potato chips, we hold that the 
quality of export growth does matter, and that ftas are 
not the ideal means to achieving such quality growth. 
ftas have proven useful for boosting exports of existing 
products to existing markets, but do not help countries 
to branch into new products or markets.
The task ahead, in the realm of policymaking, is 
therefore to investigate how to promote exports of more 
value added products and how to achieve a more even 
distribution (within reason) in terms of the export mix 
and the shares of trading partners. Policymakers must 
not fixate on the signing of new ftas as if the job ended 
there. This does not mean that they should abandon the 
notion of free trade, but rather they should focus on 
how to improve existing strategies by complementing 
existing and future ftas with other measures. These 
agreements will most probably continue to be the main 
instrument used to promote free trade while the Doha 
Round remains at an impasse.
This article is but a first foray into this issue. 
Future research could involve a more thorough, case-
by-case analysis of the relationship between ftas and 
export diversification and could include other variables. 
Attention could be focused on the politics of export 
diversification and look at why the long-term benefits 
of export diversification have been passed up in favour 
of short-term gains. Another question is to what extent 
Latin American businesses and governments really support 
free trade and, more importantly, why governments 
and academics alike have defended the fta-export 
diversification nexus.
For the time being, it is clear that industrial policy 
should no longer be a taboo (Rodrik, 2011). If Latin 
American countries hope to reap the benefits of increased 
free trade through ftas, then they must recognize that 
those benefits are not automatic and that exports also 
need the guidance of a goal-oriented strategy. Only time 
will tell whether the Latin American State is an ideal 
partner to that end. 
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